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Abstract:
The crises in Southeast and East Asia have started a new round of debate on the benefits
and disadvantages of globalisation. We have to ask whether the crises in Asia were the result of
failures in national economic policy or whether they were the consequence of ill-constructed
global financial markets. It can be concluded that the crises were caused by a number of factors,
both internal and external, but that the decisive shifts came from actors on international financial
markets as well as from the IMF, whose activities fuelled the crises.
           
To avoid a repetition, a number of options are discussed, including the introduction of a
currency regime between the major players in the world economy as well as unilateral measures
to defend developing countries’ economies against volatile international financial markets.
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3Introduction:
Since July 1997, we are witnesses of severe crises in East and Southeast Asia. There are at
least two types of crises that we can distinguish from each other: first, the developing countries
of the region have been subject to a sudden collapse in the confidence in their currencies and a
subsequent dramatic devaluation. This process has started in Thailand in summer 1997 and has
spread quickly through the region. Second, the affected countries in the region are confronted
with a credit crisis at the same time: short-term loans from overseas lenders have been
withdrawn and the affected countries were not able to roll over their debt.
One of the more important questions seems to be whether those two crises have been caused
by globalisation, in particular the increased flow of capital, or whether the origins of the crises
lie in the economic policies of the affected countries.2 In other words: Are the economic
problems of the region, as Stanley Fischer from the IMF has called them, “homegrown”, or are
they caused by global forces which operate in structures designed in a wrong way?
In this paper, I will first look at the origins of the crisis in East and Southeast Asia. I will argue
that, in contrast to the interpretation of the crisis by the IMF and other institutions, the reasons
for the problems were only partly due to ill-advised policies in the region. Secondly, I will
introduce some policy measures that could contribute to a more stable global economy. These
measures basically can address the problem of instability and volatility on two levels: the level
of national economic policy making and the level of a new or modified architecture of the
world economy.
1. Origins of the Asian crisis
In order to develop proposals for both national and international strategies to avoid financial
crises in the future, it is necessary to understand the Asian crisis better. In contrast to the
                                         
2) Although there is not just one crisis, I will use the generic term ‚Asian crisis‘ throughout the rest of
the paper.
4IMF’s view, who characterised the crisis as ”mainly homegrown”, the crisis could only develop
because of a number of factors. The more important factors are:
1.1. The economic success of the Asian countries prior to the crisis
After the crisis had turned the formerly successful economies into countries characterised by
poverty and despair, the successes of the past were forgotten too quickly.
Perhaps market participants were most shocked by the fact that they had not foreseen the
crisis. Virtually nobody had predicted dramatic economic difficulties. As the crisis deepened,
previous appraisals for the economic policies of the region were no longer heard: the entire
development model in Southeast and East Asia, often praised as models, suddenly was
responsible for all the turmoil. Yesterday‘s advantages turned into today‘s obstacles for
economic development:
 “The attachment to the family becomes nepotism. The importance of personal
relationships rather than formal legality becomes cronyism. Consensus becomes
wheel-greasing and corrupt politics. Conservatism and respect for authority become
rigidity and an inability to innovate. Much-vaunted educational achievements
become rote-learning and a refusal to question those in authority” (The Economist,
25 July 1998, p. 23).
It seems necessary to look at the achievements of the past to understand the crisis better.
5Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Real growth of GDP p.a.
in % 1975-82
6.2 7.1 5.6 7.0 7.0
Real growth of GDP p.a.
in % 1983-89
5.5 5.4 1.1 9.6 8.1
Real growth of GDP p.a.
in % 1990-95
8.0 8.8 2.3 7.8 9.0
Real growth of GDP p.a.
in % 1996
8.0 8.6 5.7 7.1 6.4
Real growth of GDP p.a.
in % 1997a
5.0 7.0 4.3 6.0 0.6
Rate of inflation p.a. in %
1975-82
15.0 5.3 11.0 17.6 9.0
Rate of inflation p.a. in %
1983-89
8.1 2.0 15.4 3.8 3.1
Rate of inflation p.a. in %
1990-95
8.7 3.5 10.8 6.6 5.0
Rate of inflation p.a. in %
1996
7.9 3.5 8.4 4.9 5.9
Rate of inflation p.a. in %
1997a
8.3 3.7 5.2 4.3 6.0
Balance of public budgets
in % of GDP 1996
+1.4 +4.2 -0.4 / +1.6
Balance of public budgets
in % of GDP 1997a +2.0 +1.6 -0.9 / -0.4
Current account deficit in
% of GDP 1990-95
-2.5 -6.2 -4.1 -1.4 -6.7
Current account deficit in
% of GDP 1996
-3.3 -4.9 -4.7 -4.9 -7.9
Current account deficit in
% of GDP 1997b
-1.2/-2.9 -9.9/-5.1 -2.9/-5.2 -2.0/-1.9 -2.0/-2.0
Rate of savings in % of
GDP 1996
28.8 36.7 19.7 33.3 33.1
Rate of savings in % of
GDP 1997a
27.3 37.0 21.0 32.9 33.8
a) Estimates
b) IMF/BIS-data.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook, Interim Assessment, December 1997, pp. 49-51; J.P.Morgan, World
Financial Markets, First Quarter 1998, IMF 1998a, BIS 1998a, p. 34.
6The data in table 1 shows that none of the economies displayed a deterioration of the
macroeconomic data prior to the crisis. The current account deficits in Thailand were perhaps
the most alarming figures, but in a situation with fully or partly liberalised capital account it is
not clear which role autonomous capital imports play. Current account deficits do not
necessarily have to reflect the decisions of economic agents in a country, hey can also reflect
the decision of foreign investors to import capital into an economy. Therefore, neither the
current account deficits of the years prior to 1997 have to be a consequence of “wrong”
economic policy nor do the substantial surpluses in both South Korea and Thailand in 1998
reflect “better” economic policies today. All we can say is that prior to the crisis capital flowed
into the countries, since then they realise an outflow of capital.
1.2. The dismantling of capital controls in the process of the deregulation of the Asian
economies
Basically, anybody who wished to study the consequences of a deregulation of the financial
sector including the dismantling of capital controls could have studied the experience of
Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s. In a nutshell, both the Australian government as well
as the New Zealand government sought to improve the efficiency of their financial sector by
deregulating them and by allowing foreign competition. Capital could flow freely in and out of
the country. The consequences were disastrous: Initially, money flowing into the Australian
economy put upward pressure on the Australian dollar. In that situation, many private actors,
permitted to do so in the deregulated environment, borrowed money abroad. Some Australian
farmers, ill advised by their local bank manager, borrowed in foreign currency without
knowing the risks. When the Australian dollar plunged, the crisis spread into the real economy.
Both Australia’s and New Zealand’s foreign debt rose considerably after deregulation: in
Australia, gross debt rose from A $ 35.7 billion (1983) to A $ 191.3 billion in 1992, in New
Zealand the foreign debt rose from NZ $ 17.4 billion (1984) to NZ $ 62.1 billion in 1992.3
The situation in Southeast and East Asia was broadly comparable. Whereas the countries of
the region had been reluctant to dismantle capital controls, in the 1990s these controls wher
reduced in order to increase the efficiency of the financial system. With the benefit of hindsight,
the increase of efficiency, i.e. lower interest rates for domestic borrowers, was paid for with
increased instability and volatility.
                                         
3) For a more detailed discussion of the consequences of deregulation in Australia and New Zealand see
Dieter 1998d, pp. 36ff.
71.3. The use of open financial systems that were not properly prepared for international
competition and not very competitive
Closely related is the deregulation of the financial sectors. The dismantling of capital controls
does not improve the efficiency of the financial sector if there is no deregulation and no
increase in competition. Again, experiences elsewhere could have shown that such a move
results in substantial risks. The debt crisis (once more, it is rather crises) in Latin America in
the 1980 proved that private borrowers can lead an economy into an unwanted situation. It
may be rational for an individual borrower to use cheaper credit available on international
markets, but for the economy of a country this collective behaviour may result in a risky
situation. It is interesting to note the comments Stanley Fischer made on that issue before he
became Deputy Managing Director of the IMF:
"... domestic firms should not be given unrestricted access to foreign borrowing,
particularly non-equity financing. In both Chile and Argentina, the lenders in
essence forced the government to take over the debt of failing private borrowers. The
argument was that the credit of the country would be impaired unless the government
stood behind its domestic firms. It might have been expected that the lenders' interest
in being repaid would be sufficient for them to exercise due caution in lending. But
there is much evidence of unwise lending that imposes externalities on other firms
and the government of a country. For this reason, governments should monitor even
private sector borrowing, and may sometimes have to limit such borrowing" (Stanley
Fischer: Issues in International Economic Integration, Bangkok: 1991, p. 20; quoted
in Gruen 1991, p. 13).
In this context, it is certainly true that banking supervision in the Asian countries was not very
good. However, by that standard it was not very good in the lending banks’ countries either.
The problem is that the bank supervisors in Thailand are not informed if a Thai company
borrows, say, from the Dresdner Bank in Germany. The German authorities are informed, but
they did not intervene. And why should they: As long as there is no risk for the lending bank to
go bust, there is no problem for the bank supervision in Germany. Lending by its very nature is
risky and only those failing to take risks will not loose money, but they also will not make
money in the first place. Therefore, the calls for better banking supervision miss the picture at
least partly. The calls for better supervision also miss another point: the credit crisis in Asia
was a consequence of the currency crisis. Without the collapse of the value of the currencies
many more borrowers would have been able to service their debts. Currency crises, however,
could hardly been predicted, let alone be taken into account by bank supervisors.
81.4. Wrong judgements by economic policy makers in the Asian countries, who
underestimated the risks of international financial markets and who were blinded by
their successes with manufactured products
Not only policy makers, but almost entire societies seemed to have ignored the risks of their
activities. Although it is easy to forget the rising prosperity once the crisis has hit, one should
consider the background of developments in Asia. The countries of the region had enjoyed
impressive economic growth. Within one generation, poverty in countries like Indonesia was
greatly reduced. But continuous high growth also led to complacency. Some managers and
policy makers might have known crises only from history books: before the current crisis the
last years in which real GDP growth of less than 5 per cent were recorded were 1985 in
Indonesia, 1980 in South Korea and 1972 in Thailand. But not only the absence of experiences
with crises, but also the structures of companies, the financial sector and the government were
unable to cope with the rapid growth (cf. BIS 1998a, p. 35).
Another reason why policy makers were underestimating the risks lies in the potential analogy
between markets for goods and markets for financial services. Policy makers might have
thought that they would be able to replicate the strategies they used previously in the markets
for goods. By opening financial sectors asymmetrically it could have been hoped that only the
domestic companies would have advantages. Foreign banks, for instance, were not allowed to
have full access to the market, but Asian banks could exploit the advantages of having access
to the international financial markets. The problem is that the forces at play in financial markets
work in a different way: when customers in one country stop buying your products you can
still switch to another market, but when creditors call in their money they all tend to do it at
the same time. Therefore, the risk of asymmetrical opening of the financial sector is completely
different from a mercantilist delay in the opening of the domestic market.
1.5. The new, increased power of international speculators, who first brought down the
Thai baht and then other currencies
At the beginning of the crisis, much was said about international speculation that brought down
the currencies of the region. In particular Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamed,
accused speculators. In 1998, Mahathir renewed his criticism, but avoided using the idea of a
conspiracy again:
 “They do not work in concert of course. Nor do they enter a conspiracy. But they do
behave like herds. Thus when one of the more important members swing in one
9direction, the other will follow. The effect is not unlike acting in concert” (Mahathir
1998).
It has to be asked whether Mahathir’s accusations contain an element of truth. To understand
that matter better, the mechanisms of speculation against a currency have to be taken into
consideration.
The basic formula is quite simple: if a speculator expects the devaluation of a currency, for
instance the Thai baht, he has to take up a loan denominated in Thai baht. That sum is then
transferred into another currency, e.g. US-Dollar. Once the currency the debt is denominated
in is devalued, the speculator can pay back the loan using less US-Dollars than he had got
before the devaluation. It is important that the speculator doesn’t hold assets in US-Dollars,
since that would impair him from benefiting from a devaluation.4
It has to be taken into consideration that speculation of that kind is only possible in open
financial markets. Only if no capital controls exist can speculators borrow substantial amounts
of money in the target country. Without that lever speculation against a central bank that holds
substantial currency reserves is not possible. It is possible that the owners of domestic currency
loose confidence in their currency and try to exchange it for US-Dollar or other hard currency,
but their levers are, as long as capital controls exist, substantially weaker than those used in
Asia.5
Since the beginning of the Asian crisis, Paul Krugman has looked at speculation several times.
He concluded, however, that speculation against a currency is only possible if fundamental
problems existed:
“Even in models with self-fulfilling features, it is only when fundamentals – such as
foreign exchange reserves, the government fiscal position, the political commitment
of the government to the exchange regime – are sufficiently weak that the country is
potentially vulnerable to speculative attack” (Krugman 1998a, p. 6).
Krugman’s argument is both theoretically weak as well as not verifiable in empirical analysis.
He gives no hint regarding the amount of reserves that are necessary and which fiscal position
is without risk. Also, the use of an indicator that cannot be measured, the commitment of a
                                         
4) For a description of the opening of positions see Köhler 1998, p. 192f.
5) Basically, owners of domestic currency will have to smuggle it out of the country. As everybody
knows, this is not impossible, but the risk of being caught and losing money certainly does not provide a strong
incentive to violate capital controls.
10
government, does not make his argument more plausible. Without some figures regarding the
necessary level of reserves and a more precise definition of ‘political commitment’, Krugman’s
argument does not help us to understand the collapses of the currencies in Asia.
After the Asian crisis, we have to redefine our understanding of the power of speculation in
globalised, deregulated markets. The empirical evidence we now have shows that even
countries with high reserves and high fiscal surpluses, like Thailand, can be attacked
successfully by speculators.6
1.6. Institutional investors have gained in importance
Another point to consider when thinking about the reasons for the crisis in Asia is the rapidly
growing power of institutional investors, which comprise pension funds, insurance companies
and mutual funds. In 1995, institutional investors, according to BIS-data, held investments
worth over US-$ 20,950 billion. By comparison, the GDP of the G-7 countries in 1994 totalled
US-$ 17,150 billion. Each category of institutional investors roughly h ld one third of the
total. By country, however, differences are more marked. Half of the investments of
institutional investors are held by American companies ($ 10,500 billion), whereas Japan ($
3,035 billion) and Great Britain ($ 1,790 billion) are on places two and three.
Without going into a detailed analysis of the ways these institutional investors work, it seems
fair to say that they have not contributed to a greater stability of the world financial system.
Rather, they have made financial markets significantly more volatile. The fear of being beaten
by other fund managers as well as institutional requirements that hinder in particular the
managers of pension funds to hold a certain position once that investment has been
downgraded by rating agencies, result in herd behaviour rather than anti-cyclical self-balancing
of the market. The Bank for International Settlements has underlined these risks:
“The fear that underperformance, even if it could be attributed to purely random
events, may lead to cash outflows and hence lower management fees creates the
incentive to avoid positions that can result in large deviations from the benchmark.
Managers‘ incentive to follow each other’s trading strategies closely is further
strengthened when the evaluation is performed against a peer universe”(BIS 1998a,
S. 91).
                                         
6) In late September 1998, however, we have also learnt that speculators themselves can loose ubstantial
amounts of money, as shown by the collapse of John Meriwether‘s hedge fund, the ‚Long-Term Capital
Management‘ (LTCM).
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1.7. The pro-cyclical behaviour of the international rating agencies
Closely related with the increasing power of institutional investors is the rising influence of
rating agencies. Ideally, rating agencies should be able to spot developments in the markets
before everybody else does. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case. As a look at the
development of ratings in Asia shows, the rating agencies have basically followed the panic of
the markets. In fact, the agencies may even have contributed to the deterioration of confidence.
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Table 2: Development of the ratings by Moody’s und Standard & Poor’s for
sovereign, long-term debt denominated in foreign currency
Moody’s Standard & Poor’s
Rating Date Rating Date
Indonesia Baa3 ¯ 14.3.1994 BBB-  ¯ 20.7.1992
BBB   ­ 18.4.1995
BBB-  ¯ 10.10.1997
Ba1   ¯ 21.12.1997 BB+    ¯ 31.12.1997
B2     ¯ 9.1.1998 BB       ¯ 9.1.1998
B         ¯ 27.1.1998
B3     ¯ 20.3.1998 B-        ¯ 11.3.1998
South Korea A2     ¯ 18.11.1988 A+       ¯ 1.10.1988
A1     ­ 4.4.1990 AA-     ­ 3.5.1997
A+       ¯ 24.10.1997
A3     ¯ 27.11.1997 A-        ¯ 25.11.1997
Baa2  ¯ 10.12.1997 BBB-    ¯ 11.12.1997
Ba1    ¯ 21.12.1997 B+        ¯ 22.12.1997
BB+      ­ 18.2.1998
Thailand A2      ¯ 1.8.1989 A-         ¯ 26.6.1989
A          ­ 29.12.1994
A3      ¯ 8.4.1997 A-        ¯ 3.9.1997
Baa1   ¯ 1.10.1997 BBB     ¯ 24.10.1997
Baa3   ¯ 27.11.1997
Ba1     ¯ 21.12.1997 BBB-     ¯ 8.1.1998
¯ = downgrading; ­ = upgrading; ratings in italics characterise non-investment-grade (high-risk) ratings.
Source: BIS 1998a, p. 127.
Neither of the two big ratings agencies has spotted the problems that we now see in the case of
Indonesia and South Korea. In the case of Thailand, Moody’s can claim that they downgraded
Thailand in April 1997, but the country’s rating at that time (A3) certainly did not indicate any
dramatic problem. Rather, the rating agencies deepened the trouble by rapidly downgrading the
countries once the crisis had begun.
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Up to know, I have concentrated on the activities of the private sector. It is evident that
uncontrolled forces have not been self-regulating, but have instead displayed the ineffectiveness
of markets, at least in specific conditions. In contrast to what neo-liberal thinking would
suggest, markets have dramatically overshot and have not shown self-regulating features.
Governments and government-funded agencies, like the IMF, did, however, not fare
substantially better.
1.8. The increased power of the IMF, that primarily had the well-being of international
investors in mind
Once the crisis in Thailand hit, it could have been hoped that the crisis management
orchestrated by the International Monetary Fund would help to clear up the mess.
Unfortunately, this was not the case. The IMF instead fuelled the crisis by adopting the wrong
policies and thereby increasing the instability and volatility in the markets.
The IMF's importance in the crisis management cannot be overstated. Not only did the Fund
use a substantial part of its own resources, but it also worked as a catalyst for raising money
from other multilateral as well as bilateral donors. Furthermore, the IMF’s insistence on the
implementation of the policies the Fund regarded as appropriate as well as its opposition to
other, regional mechanisms to calm the crisis, make the IMF fully responsible for the current
turmoil in the affected countries.
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Table 3: Financial aid from bi- und multilateral donors in billion US-Dollar
Agreed Financial Contributions
Disbursements of the IWF
until 10th April 1998
IWF World
Bank and
ADB
Bilateral Balance
Indonesia 9.9 8.0 18.7 36.6 3.0
South Korea 20.9 14.0 23.3 58.2 15.1
Thailand 3.9 2.7 10.5 17.1 2.7
Balance 34.7 24.7 52.5 111.9 20.8
Source: IMF 1998a, p. 2 (Annex).
The IMF had from the beginning of the crisis a very simplistic view of what had happened.
Basically, the IMF and, as its most outspoken analyst, Stanley Fischer regarded the crisis as
caused by mistakes in the Asian countries (Fischer 1998a, p. 2). Accordingly, the medicine
prescribed by the IMF was trying to address problems that were, in some cases, non-existent.
The IMF asked for a tightening of the governments’ fiscal position, in a situation that was
characterised by fiscal surpluses before the crisis began, and demanded a substantial rise in
domestic interest rates. Both these demands actually worsened the problems:
- A tightening of the fiscal position in the crisis is pro-cyclical and counter-productive. It will
increase instability rather than decrease it. These policies are quite similar to those
employed by President Hoover in the US and Chancellor Brüning in Germany in the 1930s.
Even if a Keynesian anti-cyclical approach is not regarded as useful, fiscal policy should at
least have remained neutral.
- The lifting of interest rates increases the trouble of the private sector. The rise of interest
rates increased the cost of debt service of both debt denominated in foreign currency (due
to the devaluation) as well as that of domestic debt. Interest rate rises actually are
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instruments that should be used to cool overheated economies. In Asia, they led the
countries straight into recession.
These policies could perhaps be justified if they showed some success. However, the desired
stabilisation of exchange rates was not achieved nor was the general deterioration of the
economic development halted.
Table 4: The development of selected currencies in Asia 1997-1998
Exchange rate to the US-
Dollar on 24 June 1997
Exchange rate to the US-
Dollar on 24 June 1998
Devaluation against the
US-Dollar in per cent
Indonesia 2,432 14,750 83,5
Malaysia 2,52 3,95 36,2
Philippines 26,4 41,5 36,4
Singapore 1,43 1,66 13,9
South Korea 888 1,381 35,7
Taiwan 27,9 34,4 18,9
Thailand 25,3 41,1 38,4
Source: The Economist, 27.6.1998, p. 124.
Looking at the data in table 4, one has to ask whether the situation could perhaps have been
worse. Is it reasonable to expect a strong devaluation in case the IMF would not have
intervened? Probably not. At least in the case of Indonesia, the devaluation against the dollar
has been so strong that the rupiah has been worthless anyway. The other countries that
received IMF help also have witnessed devaluations of over one third, which is quite
substantial by any standard and particularly remarkable when considering the spotless
macroeconomic record prior to the crisis.
Nevertheless, the IMF has time and again declared that its policy recommendations were
adequate and the only possibility in the given economic environment (see, for example, IMF
1997a, p. 5; Fischer 1998a, p. 2; IMF 1998a, p. 3). That, however, is questionable. More and
more observers argue that the IMF badly mishandled the crisis (see, for example, Bello 1998;
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Feldstein 1998; Nunnenkamp 1998; Sachs 1997b). The IMF could have recommended a
different policy:
- It could have stressed the liquidity help element in its programmes. Even if there have been
elements of crony capitalism in Southeast Asian countries, a crisis certainly is not the right
time to address these problems and force the countries in trouble to adopt a radical policy
shift (cf. Feldstein 1998). Also, one has to ask why those problems (lack of transparency,
nepotism, etc) were not raised by the IMF earlier.
- The IMF accepts that markets ‘overreacted‘ and that the devaluation of currencies went
too far (cf. Fischer 1998a, p. 2). Moreover, the IMF stopped the Indonesian government
from implementing a currency board. The problem here is that the IMF did not offer any
alternative solution to Indonesia‘s problems. It continued to expect the markets to provide
solutions in a time when markets clearly were undervaluing currencies and thereby
deepening the (credit) crisis.
- The IMF acted as an agent for creditors and ignored the consequences of its policies for
the people in the affected countries. It bailed out foreign investors, without forcing them to
share a substantial part of the burden, and imposed the hardship on the population in the
countries in crisis.7 As John Kenneth Galbraith put it:
„The peculiar genius of the IMF is to bail out those most responsible and extend the
greatest hardship to the workers, who are not responsible“ (The Observer, 21 June
1998, B 4).
1.9. The absence of a regional power that could have taken measures against the collapse
of the affected economies
The crisis could also develop because there was no decisive regional effort to bring it to a halt.
Japan could perhaps have made an effective effort to help the region out of trouble, but a
combination of lack of political will in Japan as well as opposition from both the US-
government and the IMF stopped the initiative for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). In
August/September 1997, the idea for an AMF was brought into the debate by Japan. The AMF
                                         
7) We still havn‘t seen the entire dimension of the crisis in particular in Indonesia. According to a
UNICEF study, due to malnutrition and an increasing number of school drop-outs, as well as declining health
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would have been equipped with capital of US $ 100 billion and was meant to have various
functions: the funds should have been used against currency speculation, as liquidity help in
acute balance of payments problems as well as help to finance long-term programmes for
economic restructuring. In general, the AMF’s approach would have been less austere than the
IMF programmes (cf. Bello 1998). On a more political level, the AMF contains, just like the
‘East Asian Economic Caucus’, an element of ‘Thinking East-Asian’, i.e. a deliberate attempt
to develop a way of thinking that contrasts with Western approaches (cf. Higgott 1998b, p.
12).
The failure of Japan to establish the AMF will weaken Japan’s position in East Asia, perhaps
decisively. The establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund could have supported Tokyo’s
claims for leadership in the region. It even represented, as Walden Bello called it, a ‘golden
opportunity’ for Japan (see Bello 1998, p. 18). The inability of the Japanese political elites to
use this opportunity may have been caused by the country’s position somewhere between the
West and the East. But whereas this might have been an advantage in the past, today Japan
seems to be more isolated than ever. The big winner seems to be China, which helped to calm
the situation in particular by not devaluing its own currency when all other countries in the
region did exactly that (cf. Dieter/Higgott 1998).8
It has to be noted that the unsolved financial sector crisis in Japan was another factor that
contributed towards the development of the crisis. The reason for that is that the Japanese
government and central bank tried to stabilise the ailing financial sector by keeping interest
rates very low: since 1995 the central bank’s benchmark rate stands at 0.5 per cent. The
consequence of this was, however, that capital was moved out of Japan into more profitable
investments, many of them in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia. Japanese creditors had, in
early 1998, outstanding debts to the five countries most affected of about $ 97.2 billion, more
than French, German, British and American banks at the same time (cf. Financial Times,
30.1.1998, p. 11).9 In other words; most of the ‘hot money’ that was invested in the emerging
Asian markets came from basically bankrupt Japanese banks. The fact they are now faced with
another crisis does not ease their situation at home.
                                                                                                                          
services, an entire generation could suffer from the consequences of the crisis (cf. Sydney Morning Herald, 20
October 1998).
8) Needless to say that mosother countries did not devalue deliberately.
9) Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea. The relatively low exposure of American
creditors in early 1998 can partly be attributed to the recalling of loans early in the crisis.
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How the problems of the Japanese financial sector can be solved is currently intensely debated.
It seems fair to say that the present Japanese government is unable to both revitalise the
economy and at the same time provide a solution for the financial sector. Most economists
seem to have run out of ideas, too: In a quite interesting manner some observers have asked
for the creation of confidence, but how exactly  that could be created remains a myth. Paul
Krugman, never reluctant to offer an unconventional solution, suggested the creation of
inflation to achieve a negative real interest rate in Japan (cf. The Economist, 25.7.1998, p. 80).
The problem is that with Japan’s newly deregulated financial system negative real interest rates
in Japan would only result in a further flow of capital out of the country. To stop precisely this
has been the centrepiece of a proposal by Richard McCormack, Under Secretary of State in the
US-Administration. He suggested the introduction of a tax on capital exports from Japan (cf.
Financial Times, 28.8.1998, p. 14).
In October 1998, the Japanese government announced that the financial sector will be b iled
out with taxpayer’s money, with the bill coming up to $ 600 billion. With no details being
given, one has to ask where could they get that money from. Raising taxes would further
weaken the economy, borrowing the money would certainly not create the confidence in the
future that Japan seems to need today. For the time being, the rest of the world can only
witness Japan’s muddling through an ever deeper crisis.10
1.10. The absence of a supranational regional institution that could have developed a joint
strategy to master the crisis
Finally, the absence of a regional institution made the development of a strategy to overcome
the crisis difficult. In particular the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ceased to be
heard during the crisis. The APEC Summit in November 1997 only produced harmless
recommendations and expressed just the need for economic reform in the affected countries.
What a contrast to the years before, when APEC supporters claimed to have found the most
convincing approach for regional integration. Today, we have learned that institutions that
cannot help their member countries in a crisis loose a lot of their shine.
The decentralised structure of APEC, which was praised as ‘regional integration without
bureaucratic institutions’, is unable to produce a regional, as opposed to an IMF-led, solution
to the crisis. The lack of institutional strength is the main answer to that dilemma; decentralised
                                         
10) For a discussion of the solutions available to Japanese policy makers see Dieter 1998d, pp. 144-151.
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APEC departments in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member countries cannot provide
this incentive.
The consequence of APEC’s failure, together with the rise of China as both the economic and
political leader of East Asia, will probably lead to a new regional integration project. In the
medium term, a distinctively Asian project may suit the elites of East Asia better than the
APEC, which has frequently been regarded to be a tool for US-American interest.
To sum up the findings; a combination of factors was responsible for the outbreak of the Asian
crisis. Certainly the governments in the affected Asian countries made mistakes, but so did
everybody else. The unregulated flow of capital and the subsequent withdrawal of short-term
loans have not been the only reasons for the crisis, but it has become obvious that countries
showing too much confidence in the self-regulation of financial markets will suffer. In that
respect, the call for unregulated global markets suffered a severe setback. However, a more
cautious approach towards capital flows does not mean we shall return to protectionist
policies. As Jagdish Bhagwati pointed out, free trade does not equal free flow of capital (cf.
Bhagwati 1998). After the immediate consequences of the Asian crisis will have been
overcome, the emphasis should lie on the search for new types of measures to defend smaller
developing and emerging economies against the volatility of financial markets.
2. National measures to defend an economy against the volatility of international
financial markets
 After the Asian, Russian and the Brazilian crises, one of the main questions of economic policy
today is how to defend a country against both speculative attacks on its currency as well as
avoid the ”hot money” of investors.
2.1. Avoiding speculation against a currency
 Speculative attack on a currency can partly be avoided by following a strategy of undervaluing
a currency. However, even that is difficult. To start with, it is difficult to measure the ”real”
value of a currency. Floating exchange rates are not an answer because they expose the
country to exchange rate volatility, an undesirable consequence.
 To avoid the massive speculation that characterised the Thai case the only possibility, apart
from more massive capital controls, is to prohibit the use of domestic credit by foreigners. The
reason is that speculators need an open position denominated in the currency they want to
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attack, i.e. they need substantial debt denominated in that currency. Without that debt, which is
easier to repay after a devaluation, the motive for an attack on the currency disappears. Today
we see exactly that happening in Hong Kong: the local banks there are (deliberately) restricting
Hong Kong dollar denominated loans to foreign borrowers. They are able to do so because the
number of large banks that could lend sufficient amounts of money to foreigners is limited, and
the banks in Hong Kong have no incentive to reduce the value of their own assets by
encouraging devaluation.
 2.2. Avoiding unwanted short-term capital inflows
 The inflow of ”hot money” can be restricted. The best known example is Chile, which required
a 30 per cent deposit with the Chilean Central Bank for all foreign loans. That deposit
(“encaje”) had to remain with the Central Bank for one year and did not attract interest
payments. Long-term loans are not excluded, but that measure represents a declining burden
for long-term loans: the longer the maturity period of the loans, the lower is the additional cost
of the deposit.
 The basic idea, regardless of the exact construction of the instrument, is always similar. By
making domestic loans cheaper relative to foreign loans the risk of a sudden withdrawal of
capital is reduced. None of these instruments will be perfect, but they offer increased stability
of the financial sector without losing too much efficiency.
2.3. Other capital controls
Paul Krugman has advocated more capital controls to overcome the acute crisis. However, a
sceptical note seems appropriate. Capital controls may contribute to the crisis prevention, but
for the solution of an acute crisis they might be a dangerous instrument. The reason is that in a
crisis, economic policy is not confronted with a strong inflow of capital, but rather with an
outflow. Technically, this loss of faith in the economy of a country could be countered with
capital controls, but at least temporarily the crisis of confidence could be deepened further;
investors would probably have even less trust in the future. Also, the outflow of capital is much
harder to control than the inflow of money. Few investors would be willing to invest illegally in
a country, since they would risk the loss of their investment. However, taking money out of an
economy has proved to be quite common with owners of capital, whether in Latin America or
even in developed countries like Italy before capital controls were dismantled there.
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3. A new architecture for the international financial system
After the Asian crisis, we might have to consider a new architecture for the world financial
system. The current system was not able to provide either stability or an effective management
of the crises. This certainly applies not only to Asia: the developments in the Russian
Federation, where both the private sector as well as the IMF produced quite sobering
performances, is perhaps an even stronger argument for an overhaul of the international
financial system.
3.1. Reform of the IMF
The IMF should not continue to operate in its present form. Its policy recommendations have
led Russia into political and economic turmoil. In Asia, the IMF has done little to stabilise the
economies in trouble. It may even have fuelled the crisis by introducing unnecessary measures
which were later, after the crises were in full blossom, modified. In the past, the IMF has paid
little attention to the consequences of its activities for the poorer part of the population in the
countries which needed the IMF's help. Therefore, even today’s insistence on some measures
to stabilise the welfare of the poor seems to be rather window dressing.11
The options for the IMF are substantial reform, regionalisation or privatisation. Substantial
reform would require a strengthening of the liquidity help element in IMF programs, more
public debate about the work of the IMF, less influence for creditors. The influence of the
”Wall Street – Treasury Complex” (Jagdish Bhagwati) that dominates policy making in the
IMF has to be reduced. The key to that would be a significantly more prominent role for
Europe. The chances for that are better than ever. The victory of the left-leaning coalition in
Germany in the elections of 27 September results in an unprecedented situation: for the first
time ever, left governments are in power in Europe’s three leading countries. Taking the views
of the British and the French governments during the recent World Bank/IMF Annual Meeting
in Washington into consideration, we could see a European effort to reshape the IMF.12
                                         
11) Governments in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea seem to have been reluctant in accepting the
measures the IMF wanted to introduce for the poor. The understandable argument was that social security
systems alien to the Asian societies should better not be introduced in an unplanned manner.
12) Major opposition against a European push in the IMF is hard to spot. French President Jaques Chirac
has in the past made too many mistakes in the international arena to stand up against the rest of the EU. Also,
he has not tended to be overly reluctant when specific European matters had to be pushed against opposition.
The smaller EU countries are unlikely to oppose a move of the bigger countries. It is thus hard to see where
there could be general disagreement against IMF reform. Finally, even if there were disagreement by the
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It could also be argued that three regional funds (Asian, American, European with joint
competence for Africa) would be a better solution. It is difficult to justify the existence of an
inefficient bureaucracy in Washington that claims responsibility for the world economy, but
clearly is overburdened with that task. During the Asian crisis, many incident have been
reported that underline the lack of knowledge in the IMF with regard to the economic and
political situation in the countries visited by the IMF. Regional funds, which could be better
prepared to monitor economic development, would strengthen the regional element that is
already today characterising economic cooperation.
Furthermore, one seriously has to ask whether an institution like the IMF, which takes pride in
being a fortress of blunt neoliberal economic thinking, is able to revise its strategies in the
direction of a more regulated world financial market.
The current IMF, which sees itself as ”a confidential economic adviser as well as a watchdog
for the international community” could also be privatised, since that role of a ”Super-
Moody’s” is not one for a publicly financed institution.
3.2. A new currency regime?
A new currency regime seems more necessary than ever. We need more stable exchange rates,
which are, as the experience of the last 20 years has shown, difficult to achieve with floating
exchange rates. One option could be a currency regime built around a stable Dollar-Euro
exchange rate. In the medium term it could be developed into a tripolar currency regime, with
a yet to be found Asian currency as a third pillar. A world currency council could be the
institution implementing that regime; both the American and the European central bank would
have to participate as well as the reformed (regionalised?) IMF.
At this stage, the inclusion of the Japanese yen certainly would not make sense. The Japanese
monetary policy is not very transparent and it is subordinated to political goals. For the same
reasons, an Asian Monetary Union is a rather distant prospect.
As an alternative to a world currency regime based on a Euro-D llar regime, one could
imagine a set of regional schemes. I doubt, however, whether such a scheme would provide a
substantial improvement over today’s system. Even today, we find regional links between
                                                                                                                          
smaller EU countries it would not matter much because the individual countries, not the EU, are members of
the IMF.
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currencies, in particular between the dollar and Latin American currencies and the German
mark and East European currencies. These links have, whichever form they took, provided
increased stability, but they did not have an influence on the at times dramatic swings between
the major world currencies.
Having suggested a new currency regime, however, it seems necessary to stress that the
realisation of such a scheme is not very likely. European policy makers might have found find
the concept of fixed exchange rates attractive and have voiced their sympathy for it, such as
the new German Minister of Finance, Oskar Lafontaine. But it is unrealistic to expect any
substantial support for fixed exchange rates in the US, at least at this stage. Things may
change, however, when the current boom of the US economy finally bottoms out and, at the
same time, imports will continue to rise. Although even a trade deficit of $ 300 billion is
technically not a problem, politically it might still be regarded to be one, in particular in the
forthcoming election year 2000.
3.3. The need for a “World Financial Organisation” (WFO)
For the stabilisation of credit relations we should consider the introduction of a World
Financial Organization WFO. Just like we have a World Trade Organisation we need a similar
institution for organising financial relations. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in
Basle is not able to shoulder that task, although its analyses have been among the best. As an
organisation of central banks, the BIS cannot provide an internationally binding framework.
That will have to be negotiated by governments.
The WFO should provide the framework for private agents to work in. In contrast to today’s
system, where the exporters and importers of goods have to comply with regulations, the
exporters and importers of capital work in an environment characterised by the absence of
regulation. The rather few recommendations of the BIS point in the right direction, but are too
limited in scope.
4. Conclusions
The Asian crisis has produced a crisis of the concept of globalisation, understood as a set of
ideas promoting unregulated free flow of capital, further global integration and further
reduction of the influence of governments on economic policy making. Although mistakes
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were also made in the affected countries, the more important causes of the crisis were the flow
of ‘hot money’ into Southeast Asia, the sudden withdrawal of capital and the speculation
against the currencies.
The world financial system we see today, which is largely based on the neoliberal dogma of the
universal superiority of market solutions, has failed to provide both adequate warning signals
as well as solutions once the Asian crisis developed. The answer thus is a more regulated,
though not state-centred, organisation of world financial markets.
Whether this consequence, a re-regulation of the world financial system, will be implemented
remains to be seen. As long as the US-Congress is more preoccupied with other matters, it
might not be very realistic to expect a shift in emphasis. No major player has suffered enough
to come forward with a new blueprint for the organisation of financial markets, and those in
Asia that have endured hardship have no voice in the reconstruction of the world economy.
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